Whistleblowing, anonymity, and the Norwegian National Lottery: How to keep a secret identity for 29 months

article resource:
2025 Jul Organizational Communication

New Series, Vol. 2, No. 14

Article co-author Peer Jacob Svenkerud (hereafter PJS) was Communications Director for the highly respected Norsk Tipping (Norwegian National Lottery) and reported on the organization’s chief executive officer (CEO) for a shocking misuse of corporate funds. Svenkered had joined Norsk Tipping (“NT”) in 2003 and by 2007 felt compelled to report the CEO’s funds misuse to NT’s board chairman, who already had tried to control the organization’s spending. Such reporting of unethical, illegal and/or illicit behavior in governments, corporations and other organizations is typically called “whistleblowing”; many organizations encourage it (for example, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service pays large rewards for whistleblowing) and attempt to protect whistleblowers, who still frequently lose their jobs, friends and/or careers.

In PJS’s case, NT’s CEO was forced out within six months, but two external investigations by the Auditor General of Norway and by the consulting form Deloitte, which both substantiated PJS’s allegations, took a long time, and PJS and his advisors decided to keep his identity a secret for 29 months. In the meantime, the CEO named the whistleblower the “unknown enemy,” and various people inside and outside NT, including the news media, tried to find out who the whistleblower was from NT’s 322 employees. The article’s co-authors say PJS was the only person who lied when asked a question like, “are you the whistleblower?” (But presumably the 17 others who knew the whistleblower’s identity also were sometimes asked questions about whether they knew the whistleblower’s identity or they had a hunch, etc.). So the case invokes communications ethics issues and also Norwegian cultural norms, which call for supervisory matters to be settled “quietly and without fanfare”—not what happened here.

Anonymity itself has strategic and ethical considerations. Retaliation against US whistleblowers increased significantly from 1980 to 2010 and, not surprisingly, so did US whistleblowers’ desire to remain anonymous, increasing from 24% in 1980 to 58% in 2010. But as researchers Browing, Scott, Svenkerud, and Sørnes write, “Named whistleblowers are often viewed as more credible, are accessible for follow-up questions about their claims, may be more effective, and may be able to secure support from more key stakeholders” (citations omitted).  But anonymous whistleblowing still has become more accepted generally as journalism organizations and public interest organizations have created online dropboxes the deposits to which cannot be traced.

Secrecy also is a complex topic. Many, perhaps most, cultures have a general distrust of secrecy because it is tied to deception. However, in organizations, arguments both for and against secrecy emerge depending on the context. And even organizations that value secrecy may find secrets hard to keep if the organization highly values trust and personal interactions are frequent. Secrecy is easier, even inevitable, in organizations with “segmented roles, restrained public presentation, and compartmentalized knowledge.” Such secrecy can “simultaneously isolate and empower members, and be a means for conducting both problematic and virtuous activities.” In short, some secrets are considered ethical and others are considered unethical, again depending on the context.

At least one sociologist, D. R. Gibson, has attempted to formulate a general theory of long-term secrets, which suggests six barriers that help “sustain knowledge barriers” (in other words, secrets not being leaked): internal barriers to knowing, barriers to asking, barriers to telling, barriers to perceiving, barriers to believing, and barriers to acting. Motivations for whistleblowing also are relevant as are, again, multiple ethics issues.

These researchers analyzed an edited version of a book chapter written by PJS, along with transcripts of 18 hours of interviews with PJS, NT’s annual reports and organizational inspections, and other archival materials. All were made available to an invited group of Norwegian, US, and English scholars, who focused on the time from when PJS went to NT’s board chairman with allegations until when a Norwegian newspaper revealed PJS’s identity 29 months later. The first author, Browning, used the constant comparative method to perform a grounded theory analysis, and the other three authors reacted to and refined Browning’s findings; the other three authors checked facts and interpretations with Svenkerud, and Svenkerud and Sørnes ensured that the work appropriately included Norwegian perspectives.

Three categories of explanations for how/why this secret was kept for 29 months were found: secrecy networks; the complex superior-subordinate relationship between PJS and the board chairman; and time-space relations (referring to secret meetings on- and off-site, disguised meetings on-site, phone calls that weren’t overheard, etc.). Note that other long-term organizational secrets may not be characterized by any of these three explanations, let alone all of them.

In this case, the 17 others who knew PJS’s secret were a combination of insiders and outsiders, most of whom spoke rarely (or never) to the others and when they did, said almost nothing about PJS. The 17 had various motivations for keeping the secret: personal loyalty, job requirement, patient privacy (in case of a psychologist/advisor), deep commitment to the whistleblowing’s success, and others. (Despite this support generally and from the board chairman and a PR firm employee in particular, PJS said he felt alone and isolated during the 29-month period). For others trying to find out who the whistleblower was, numerous factors threw them off: PJS’s known tense past relationship with the board chairman (which included PJS objecting to the board chairman’s conflict of interest in a business deal years earlier), PJS’s denial of being the whistleblower, no leaks from his 17 confederates, completely secret meetings and phone calls, and even Norwegian news media portrayals of NT’s communications department (including PJS) as being inept at protecting NT!

While whistleblowing in which the whistleblower reveals himself/herself, or is quickly revealed, may be seen as “one-off” and “over soon,” including often losing their job, career and/or friends, in this case whistleblowing turned out to be a long, tense process (though including the board chairman explicitly wanting to keep PJS at NT) and one can imagine other drawn-out scenarios that can and should be analyzed.


Communication Currents Discussion Questions 

  1. The article is based on one unusual case study and all scholars must be careful about generalizing from one case study. Consider what could have happened if one of 17 others who knew PJS’s secret had leaked it to Norwegian media sooner, especially before the CEO left. Or consider the possibility that PJS’s stress and anxiety could have become obvious during the 29-month-long period. Or consider what could have been different if PJS and the board chairman had been close friends or bitter foes rather than previously having had a tense but cordial relationship? Or consider if PJS had not wanted or needed the support of any others, let alone 17, during the 29 months.
  2. Would and could you trust 17 other employees of an organization to keep your secret about the CEO for 29 months? Why or why not, and under what circumstances?
  3. Collectivist cultures and Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism all highly value keeping secrets more than individualistic Western cultures. Hypothetically consider this case in such a context, where PJS possibly would have had less stress/anxiety and would not need to worry as much about 17 others keeping a secret.

For additional suggestions about how to use this and other Communication Currents in the classroom, see: https://www.natcom.org/publications/communication-currents/integrating-communication-currents-classroom 


ABOUT THE AUTHORS  

Larry Browning is professor emeritus of communication studies, University of Texas at Austin.

Craig R. Scott is John T. Jones, Jr., Centennial Professor and chair of the Department of Communication Studies at The University of Texas at Austin.

Peer Svenkerud is rector of the University of Inland Norway, which has six main campuses plus smaller campuses.

Jan-Oddvar Sørnes is Professor II, Department of Organization, Leadership and Management (Rena campus), University of Inland Norway.

This essay, by Dane S. Claussen, translates the scholarly journal article, L. Browning, C. R. Scott, P. Svenkerud, & J-O Sørnes. (2025). Whistleblowing, anonymity, and the Norwegian National Lottery: How to keep a secret identity for 29 months. Communication Monographs, DOI: 10.1080/03637751.2025.2514456. Advance online publication.

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